The prohibitions imposed by the law of this country are based upon the view that sexual conduct is wrong and immoral and cannot be permitted except where it is unavoidable for reproduction purposes. As such it fails to coincide with the customs and cultures of any group in our society. (Gordon Westwood 1952, p. 164) Freud and Westwood represent the school of thought that regards sex and sexuality as everywhere subject to unjust and unnecessary prohibition on the part of a moralistic state legislature. As such, they are among the champions of sexual liberation. Contemporary theorists of the sexual, informed by Foucault's warnings against accepting the 'repressive hypothesis' (Foucault 1976) and alerted by feminists to the tendency of sexual revolutionaries (and Foucault) to neglect gender (Jeffreys 1990 ), regard such accounts as anachronistic. However, both men make a dual claim which, I suggest, retains the ability to make sense of the homophobias. Both assert that the hedonistic aspects of sex are problematic to the statutory authorities, and both see reproduction as the only permissible justification for sexual activity in the eyes of those authorities.
Of course, such prohibitions do not simply act to prevent or repress certain behaviours. Rather, they contribute to the social construction of specific behaviours, acts, identities and persons as normal/abnormal, permitted/prohibited, moral/immoral and so forth (Mcintosh 1968 , Radicalesbians 1970 , Foucault 1976 . Nor does this prohibitive juridical discourse remain static or constant. This morning (1.12.2003), as I sat down to write the final draft of this chapter, the BBC newsreader announced that, from today, it is illegal in Britain for employers to discriminate against their lesbian, gay or bisexual employees. It should be noted, however, that such rights are granted to discrete and identifiable categories of person, categorised precisely according to a presumptive sexual orientation. In short, even the most liberalising legislation willinevitably-continue to replicate the orientationalist discourses of sexuality which attempt to contain desire within restrictive parameters in the interests of reproducing heteronormativity.
It is, of course, extremely difficult to find a position outwith hegemonic discourse from which to speak about sex, desire and gender. Thus, even the most liberal sociologists of sexuality tend, unwittingly, to reproduce the heteroerotic norm in their own work (e.g. Aries and Bejin 1985 , Hawkes 1996 , Schwartz and Rutter 1998 , Archer and Lloyd 2002 . As Liz Stanley (1999, p. 415) indicates, this is particularly the case for large-scale empirical surveys of sexual behaviour:
... such surveys operate in a context characterised by the taken-for-grantedness of what 'sex' is: everyone is assumed to know and agree about the 'what', 'when' and 'who' of sex, to the extent that the basic behaviours with which these surveys are concerned are not looked at in any detail. The gloss of 'sex' defined as 'intercourse' is more often than not used as though there can be no variant behaviour involved beneath this visible and easily investigated tip.
I have suggested elsewhere (Wilton 1995) that 'lesbian' constitutes a privileged position from which to assess and critique the operations of heteronormativity, and have issued public invitations to 'assume the lesbian position ' (Farquhar and Wilton 2000, p. 131) . This is a paradigmatically queer strategy, since it invites others, whatever their genderaffiliation and erotic preference, strategically to self-locate as lesbian for the purposes of counter-hegemonic critique. Here, I have tried to make use of the accounts gathered from lesbian and non-lesbian women not to 'explain lesbianism', nor to give outsiders an insight into 'the lesbian experience'. Rather, I have tried to use both sets of accounts to trouble, in Butler's sense, discourses of gender and of sex.
When Butler (1990, p. xi) asks, 'What kinds of cultural practices produce subversive discontinuity and dissonance among sex, gender and
